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SUMMARY.
The outbreak o f  the second w orld w ar in Europe w as an event w hich  had been 
foreseen by m any in Ireland, including the tao iseach  Eam on de V alera, but had still 
been largely unprepared for. The country, w hich had been independent for less than 
tw enty years, followed the only course o f  action available to her given th is lack o f  
preparedness and the political circum stances o f  the tim e, neutrality. This po licy  w as 
adopted for two reasons, firstly as the Irish defence forces w ere ill equipped to partake 
in a m odern war with no airforce or anti-aircraft guns w ith w hich to  defend the 
country, and secondly it was affirm ation to a global audience o f  Irelands sovereignty 
and the fact that Britain no longer dictated  her foreign policy.
This policy o f  neutrality  w as fraught w ith risk  and pitfalls for the F ianna Fail 
governm ent though. Forem ost am ong their problem s w as the issue o f  im porting 
essential supplies to the country during the period o f  the em ergency. P rior to  the w ar 
Ireland had relied on foreign ships to carry a large percentage o f  her raw  m aterials. 
H ow ever, w ith the outbreak o f  war, these ships w ere no longer in a position  to serve 
Ireland. This problem  w as com pounded by the fact that B ritish  resentm ent at Irish 
neutrality resulted in her refusing to ship supplies to Ireland or recognise Irish 
econom ic difficulties.
In response to this desperate situation Irish Shipping Ltd w as form ed in  M arch 
1941. Irish Shipping was vital to the m aintenance o f  Irish neutrality, as w ithout the 
vital im ports the company carried, Ireland w ould have faced econom ic ruin. This fact 
was recognised by m any o f  the belligerent pow ers though and consequently  Irish 
Shipping w as used as a m eans by  w h ich  to put pressure on  the Irish governm ent, in 
some instances in an effort to m ove the governm ent from  its neutral stance. The aim  
o f th is thesis is therefore to exam ine the role Irish Shipping played  in  Irish neutrality  
and to  exam ine the extent to w hich it w as used by belligerent pow ers to  pressurise the 
Irish policy  o f  neutrality.
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Introduction
N eutra lity  in w ar has never been  reg a rd ed  as an ac t o f  m uch  h o nou r, and  se lf-in te rest on th e  p art 
o f  a  nation  figh ting  for its life can  take on an  ug ly  shape w hen  it th rea tens the freedom  o f  a 
country  w hich has chosen  to stand  aside from  the c o n flic t .1
W ith the outbreak o f  the second w orld w ar in  1939 Ireland adopted a policy  o f  
neutrality, in  line w ith  other sm all E uropean states such  as Sw itzerland, Portugal, 
Sw eden and Belgium , although for very different reasons. Ireland, how ever, w as the 
only B ritish dom inion to choose neutrality  w hen w ar broke out. This m eant that, due to 
her econom ic dependence on Britain, Ireland w as forced into a position  o f  econom ic 
isolation, w ith  Britain reluctant to allocate or transport goods to  a country w hich  was 
not involved in the w ar effort. Irish Shipping L td w as form ed in A pril 1941 as a 
response to the position  o f  international seclusion that the F ianna Fail governm ent 
found itse lf faced with. The role o f  Irish Shipping in  supplying Ireland 's econom ic 
needs during the period o f  the em ergency has been w idely  acknow ledged and w ell 
docum ented, yet Irish Shipping Ltd can also be v iew ed, no t only as a physical 
m anifestation o f  the Irish policy o f  neutrality, but also as a conduit through w hich the 
British, A m erican and G erm an governm ents p laced great stress on that policy. One o f  
the central argum ents o f  this thesis will therefore be that B ritish  and A m erican actions, 
in relation to shipping, posed as great a threat to Irish neutrality  as did G erm ans actions.
The principal reason for the form ation o f  Irish Shipping w as to com bat the 
lack o f  ocean-going vessels on the Irish shipping register and to supply the country w ith 
essential raw  m aterials during the second w orld war, its creation being deem ed by  Sean 
Lem ass to  be 'as im portant for national safety as the arm y . ' 2  It can be argued that it w as 
this act, m ore than any other, that allow ed Ireland to m ain tain  her neutrality  during the 
war. A lthough the form ation o f  Irish shipping was one o f  the pillars on  w hich  Irish 
neutrality  was built, it also conversely was a source o f  great pressure for the 
governm ent. W hen discussing strains placed on Irish neutrality  historians, such as
1 R obert F isk, In tim e o f  w ar  (L ondon , 1983), p.ix .
2 The Irish  Times, 1 Feb 1941, p . l .
)
R obert F isk have tended to focus on Churchill's am biguous offers o f  a united  Ireland, 
the bom bings o f  Cam pile and the N orth  Strand and the  debate over w hether B ritain  
should  have been allow ed use o f  the treaty ports, yet the  strains p laced  on  neutrality  
through the day to day running o f  Irish Shipping have been  ignored. The establishm ent 
o f  the com pany was essential to  the m aintenance o f  neutrality , as w ithout it Ireland 
w ould have faced econom ic ruin, bu t this fact w as recognised  by bo th  the B ritish and 
A m erican governm ents, who p u t obstacles in  place o f  the sm ooth  running o f  the 
com pany, in an effort to m ove the Irish governm ent from  her neutral stance. P rior to the 
w ar agreem ents had been m ade w hereby B ritain guaranteed Ireland shipping space on 
an equal footing w ith B ritain  herself, but due to resentm ent at Irish neutrality  these 
agreem ents w ere not honoured. A s w ell as refusing to  ship Irish  goods, the B ritish  
introduced a system  o f  w arrants and navicerts w hich w ere supposed to be a  m eans o f  
controlling neutral shipping, bu t could also be used as an econom ic w eapon as they 
ensured that Irish ships could not pass allied blockades or load  supplies at allied ports 
w ithout B ritish  approval. It therefore took  the full w eigh t o f  the Irish  governm ent 
behind Irish Shipping to overcom e these obstacles and a llow  neutrality  to be 
m aintained. D uring the war, due to  the econom ics o f  supply  and dem and, ships becam e 
a valuable com m odity w ith  speculation forcing prices up. This m eant tha t Irish  Shipping 
had great d ifficulty  in  acquiring ships, w ith  the problem  being com pounded by the fact 
that in m any instances w hen ships could have been purchased, w arrants w ere denied by 
the British. A lthough tw o ships w ere chartered from  the US in 1941, after the  A m erican 
entry into the w ar requests to purchase further ships w ere vetoed, as the A m erican 
governm ent also adopted a hard line w ith  relation to shipping m atters in response to 
Irish neutrality. This thesis w ill argue that these actions w ere designed to deny Ireland 
vital shipping and consequently  supplies, in  an effort to m ove de V alera away from  his 
po licy  o f  neutrality  and coerce Ireland into the w ar on the side o f  the allies.
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The concept o f  Irish shipping as a physical m anifestation o f  Irish neutrality  can 
be seen in the m anner in  w hich the com pany was run, as Irish  ships sailed out o f  
convoy, floodlit at n ight and w ith clear neutrality  m arkings painted  on their hulls and 
decks. Irish sailors placed great confidence in these neutrality  m arkings and so the 
governm ent regarded attacks on Irish ships very seriously. A lthough for the m ost part 
neutrality  w as respected, w ith  instances o f  Irish ships being stopped by belligerent 
subm arines and allow ed to continue once their papers had been  exam ined and neutrality 
confirm ed, the sinking o f  the Irish P ine  and the Irish O ak  caused im portant diplom atic 
incidents. These attacks dam aged relations, not only betw een  Ireland and G erm any, but 
also betw een Ireland and the U .S , since these w ere the tw o ships chartered from  the U.S 
governm ent in 1941. Their sinking resulted in  com plaints being m ade by the A m erican 
governm ent that Ireland failed to deliver a protest to  G erm any over the attacks. 
Incidents such as this placed great stress on the governm ent and its neutral stance, while 
having the knock-on effect o f  increasing dissent w ith in  Ireland am ongst those 
politicians such as Jam es D illon who were in  favour o f  Ireland abandoning neutrality  
and entering the w ar on the side o f  the allies.
A num ber o f  secondary sources relating to Irish neutrality  and Ireland during the 
em ergency are available, though few  o f  them  deal w ith  the subject o f  Irish Shipping Ltd 
in great detail. The m ost relevant secondary source to th is topic is The long  watch, 
w ritten by Frank Forde, w hich deals w ith the h istory o f  the Irish m ercantile  m arine 
during the second w orld war. This w ork devotes one chapter to  Irish Shipping Ltd 
during the period, the focus o f  w hich is on the history  o f  the w artim e fleet, also 
discussing m any o f  the personalities involved with the com pany, giving biographical 
details o f  captains and crew s o f  ships w hich w ere sunk. This volum e is particularly  
useful as a general w ork on the topic or as a w ork o f  reference, though it neglects to 
exam ine the political im plications o f  Irish Shipping in  relation to Irish neutrality,
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concentrating on the hum an aspects o f  the history. A  second tex t relating to  Irish 
m aritim e history is Turn o f  the tide  by Basil Peterson. This is a w ide-ranging  w ork 
discussing Irish m aritim e history from  prehistoric tim es to  the present, and though it 
contains a chapter on the second w orld war, it does not go into detail w hen discussing 
Irish Shipping Ltd in  relation to neutrality. O f the general works on the period, m ost 
acknow ledge the im portant role Irish Shipping played in  the transfer o f  vital econom ic 
products to the country, how ever, none o f  them  recognise the political im plications the 
form ation and running o f  the com pany during a w artim e situation had for the 
governm ent. One recurring argum ent in these secondary w orks is that B ritish  and 
A m erican actions p laced as m uch pressure on Irish neutrality  as did G erm an actions, 
therefore one o f  the objectives o f  this thesis is to  exam ine this contention in  relation to 
Irish Shipping.
The lack o f  research earned  out on Irish Shipping Ltd is rem arkable, as a w ide 
range o f  prim ary source m aterial relevant to the topic is available. The greatest volum e 
o f  m aterial relating to Irish Shipping is to be found in the departm ent o f  foreign affairs 
files. The m ajority  o f  these files relate to the com pany’s relationship w ith  belligerent 
pow ers, and the actions and reactions o f  foreign pow ers tow ards the com pany. These 
files contain inform ation that is relevant to alm ost every aspect o f  this study, from  the 
difficulties encountered in acquiring ships to papers relating to attacks by belligerents 
on Irish vessels, and indicate clearly how  foreign pow ers used Irish Shipping as a  m eans 
to pressurise the governm ent and the policy o f  neutrality. A n im portant benefit o f  these 
files is the diversity o f  inform ation and sources enclosed w ithin them . N ot only do they 
contain the expected departm ental and interdepartm ental papers, bu t in som e instances 
they include extracts from  foreign new spapers and transcripts o f  radio m essages, 
broadcast to Ireland by belligerent pow ers, w hich  can often shed new  light on a  topic
3 See, for exam ple, T  R y le  D w yer, Irish neutrality an d  the USA (D ub lin , 1977); R o b ert F isk , In tim e o f  
w ar  (L ondon, 1983); B ernard  Share, The em ergency:neu tral Ire lan d  1 939 -45  (D ublin , 1987).
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from  a different angle. These help to bring an international dim ension to  the topic as 
they give inform ation from  a point o f  v iew  contrary to that o f  the Irish and it is therefore 
im portant to exam ine w hat influence, i f  any, they had upon the com pany and 
consequently  shipping policy. D epartm ent o f  foreign affairs files not only com prise o f 
records o f  official view points and statem ents, bu t also include personal statem ents o f  
ships captains and officers who w ere involved in the day to day running o f  the com pany 
on  the ground. These are im portant as they give reaction o f  those outside the decision­
m aking process to issues such as arm ing o f  m erchant vessels and sailing out o f  convoy. 
The m ain w eakness o f  the foreign affairs papers is that they  deal w ith Irish Shipping 
from  a m ainly  international perspective, and contain little inform ation on  attitudes and 
opposition tow ards the com pany w ithin Ireland.
This difficulty can be overcom e by exam ining the papers o f  the departm ent o f  
the taoiseach, w hich deal w ith the com pany from  a dom estic perspective, and are 
im portant as it w as this departm ent that form ulated official policy. M any o f  these files 
are w ritten from  a legal view point and indicate how  the governm ent w ished Irish 
Shipping to reflect the policy o f  neutrality. These files also contain the Reports o f  the 
chairm an  as presented at the annual general m eeting and these indicate the reaction o f  
those running the com pany to official policy  and governm ent intervention. A s w ith  the 
departm ent o f  the taoiseach papers the dail debates from  the period deal w ith Irish 
Shipping from  a dom estic perspective. W hereas the departm ent o f  the tao iseach  papers 
reflect governm ent policy  tow ards Irish Shipping they fail to highlight the substantial 
political opposition  to the com pany w hich is evident from  the dail debates. These 
debates raise a new  series o f  issues as w ell as adding additional inform ation to 
previously  asked questions. For exam ple, although departm ent o f  foreign affairs papers 
clearly h ighlight the problem s the com pany faced in relation to speculation and inflated 
ship prices, the dail debates reveal the opposition  from  w ithin the country  at having to
pay these prices. Just as the British and American governments used Irish Shipping Ltd 
as a means of pressurising the policy of neutrality, the company also became the focus 
of attention of many anti-neutrality TDs such as James Dillon who criticised the 
decision not to arm merchant ships and sail out of convoy. The dail debates are 
therefore useful in that they voice all sides of political opinion and can be useful to 
contrast with government files. Their major weakness is that they contain a solely 
political viewpoint and give no indication of reaction to events outside o f political 
circles. Newspapers of the time can be used to overcome this to a certain extent 
however the rigours of wartime censorship greatly restricted their reporting on events. 
Although vague when reporting on events with an international dimension such as 
attacks on Irish ships, their reaction to events such as the formation of the company is 
more outspoken. It is also interesting to note the reaction of different newspapers to 
these events. The Irish Press was strongly pro-government in stance as it had been 
founded by de Valera and his Fianna Fail party while the Irish Times did not have 
strong party political affiliations and therefore was not always as willing to support 
official government policy. However, bias can be reduced by comparing reports from 
different newspapers.
Although the primary sources in relation to Irish shipping have their limitations, 
many of them compliment each other well and thus help to fill some of the gaps. These 
sources will be used to form three main chapters. The first will deal with the formation 
of the company and the difficulties faced in doing so, concentrating particularly on 
difficulties encountered in acquiring ships. The second chapter will deal with the 
running of the company in a wartime situation and the extent to which Irish Shipping 
reflected the governments policy of neutrality. The third chapter will deal with the 
sinking of the Irish Oak and the Irish Pine and the pressure which these incidents placed
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on the government. Unfortunately the files relating to the sinking o f the Irish Pine have 
been lost so this chapter will focus to a greater extent on the sinking of the Irish Oak.
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T h e  fo r m a t io n  o f  I r is h  S h ip p in g  L td  in  a W a r t im e  S itu a t io n .
C h a p t e r  I
'This country is in the circumstances of today almost entirely dependant on 
British ships for its supply of those commodities which must come from outside, and 
the British can no longer spare the ships to carry those commodities to our quays. '4 This 
editorial carried in the Irish Times in January 1941 was one of the first times the 
shipping crisis facing Ireland in the context of the second world war was highlighted 
and brought into the public domain. According to the department o f industry and 
commerce, in 1939 only 5% of the total tonnage required for the Irish import and export 
trade was provided by Irish-owned vessels, although 32% was provided by vessels 
registered in this country.5 This meant that Ireland was almost entirely dependent on 
foreign vessels for international trade, a fact that was to cause great difficulty at the 
outbreak of war. These problems were further compounded in November 1939 when the 
United States announced that its ships would not enter the war zone, which was defined 
as the area east o f a line from northern Spain to Iceland. This meant that all American 
cargoes would now be deposited at Lisbon with Irish ships being required for further 
transport to Ireland.
With outbreak of war, the government issued Emergency Power (no 2) Order, 
which required all Irish registered ships to fly the Irish flag. This resulted in an exodus 
of ships to the British register, as neutral ships were subject to excessive restrictions in 
terms or warrants and navicerts, which will be discussed later. Prior to the war, trade 
agreements had been made with the British and the secretary of the department of 
industry and commerce 'was assured that there would be no difficulty in respect of 
shipping and that we would be on the same footing as Britain. '6 Some historians such as 
Ryle Dwyer have argued that these trade agreements were beneficial to the Irish:
Irish authorities com plied with a British request that Ireland w ould not charter neutral ships
except through Britain. In this w ay A nglo-Irish com petition for neutral shipping could be
4 The Irish Times 11 Jan 1941 p.6.
5 Shipping, report on difficulties encountered on outbreak o f  war in 1939 (N .A . Departm ent o f  industry 
and com m erce papers E H R /3/16).
6 ibid.
elim inated in order to keep chartering rates down. O f course the latter arrangement was mutually 
advantageous to both countries.7
Though in theory these trade agreements were to Irelands advantage, in practice this did 
not prove always prove to be the case. The U-boat campaign led to a hardening of 
British attitudes as is revealed in a letter from Churchill to Roosevelt dated 15 
December 1940 which stated:
you  w ill realise also that our merchant seam en, as w ell as public opinion generally, take it much  
am iss that we should have to carry Irish supplies though air and U -boat attacks and subsidise  
them handsom ely w hile de Valera is quite content to sit happy and see us strangled.8
This hardening of attitudes also led to a toughening of the British policy towards Ireland 
as revealed in the department of foreign affairs papers:
the (pre-war) arrangement w orked satisfactorily for a few  m onths, but the tonnage being  
provided for our needs by the British began to shrink from m id -1940 until N ovem ber 1940 after 
w hich no tonnage w as made available. We protested strongly at the treatment w e were receiving  
but the British took the line that they were in difficu lties and that their needs m ust com e first.9
In response to this deteriorating situation, the minister for supplies, Sean 
Lemass, announced the formation of Irish Shipping Ltd on 21 March 1941. The aim of 
the company was the acquisition o f a deep-sea cargo fleet, as was stated at the first 
ordinary general meeting: 'the primary object of the company is the acquisition of a fleet 
of cargo vessels for the purpose of importing essential supplies. '10 Irish Shipping Ltd 
was established as a limited liability company under the Companies Act, with the 
directors being nominated by the government and the company directly under 
government control. Its chairman was John Leydon, who came from the department of 
supplies, while the board included representatives o f the Limerick Steamship Co, 
Wexford Steamship Co, Palgrove Murphy Ltd, Grain Importers Ireland Ltd and a 
representative of the department o f supplies and the department o f industry and
7 T Ryle D w yer, Irish neutrality and the USA (Dublin, 1977), p. 19.
8 Frank Forde, The long watch (D ublin, 1981), p .34.
9 R efusal o f  Am erican governm ent to approve sale to  Ireland o f  ss W olverine (N .A . Foreign affairs 
papers 206 /60 /11).
10 Statement by the chairman at the first ordinary general m eeting (N .A . D ept o f  the taoiseach S 14329).
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commerce. The formation of the company was not greeted with enthusiasm from all 
circles though, with the Irish Times reporting on 24 March 1941 that:
the venture, to be frank, is in the nature o f  a gam ble for the life o f  even  a neutral vesse l in these 
days and these waters is apt to be short... in v iew  o f  everything both the risks and the expense, 
w e should not support this venture i f  the position were not alm ost desperate.11
Further opposition toward the company came from the dail during the course o f a vote 
on 19 June 1941 on whether £102,000 should be granted to the company to help defray 
expenses. James Dillon, the deputy leader of Fine Gael, was particularly critical during 
this debate, arguing that the expense o f running the company was too great:
i f  w e were to maintain a mercantile marine here w hich w ould  not go bankrupt in five years it 
w ould cost £1 ,000 ,000  a year to keep our flag on the seven  seas. E ven if  w e  had a mercantile 
marine w hich was capable o f  bringing in a substantial proportion o f  what w e consum e, it w ould  
cost us nearly £5 ,000 ,000  a year. That is the sum that w ould go  out o f  our exchequer just to have 
the glorious warm feeling that the flag o f  Ireland is flying on the seven  seas. I f  that is considered  
good  business, even in peacetim e, I think it is daft.12
This view was backed up by James Coburn, also of Fine Gael, who asked:
w ould  not the m inister get better value for the expenditure o f  that £ 2 ,000 ,000  or £3 ,000 ,000  
w ithin the country at the present tim e in the production o f  things w hich  can be got here and 
w hich ought to be got before the approach o f  winter, turf for instance?13
Despite the opposition the vote passed. However, the new company was to face more 
aggressive opposition and resentment from outside Ireland.
From the outset the fledgling company was faced with a number of serious 
problems, foremost among which was the acquisition o f ships. The necessities of war 
had lead to a massive increase in the demand for ships regardless o f their condition, 
while speculation led to inflation in prices, as John Leydon the chairman of Irish 
Shipping stated:
W e found ourselves bidding in a market w hich w as exposed  to the im pact o f  speculation on a
grand scale. There was a veritable scram ble for ships and with a full realisation o f  the urgency o f
our task w e found ourselves practically helpless when it cam e to the question o f  bargaining
11 The Irish Times 24  March 1941 p.2.
12 Dail debates, vol. 83, 19 June 1941, col. 2374.
13 ibid. col. 2403 .
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about price. The sm allest delay w ould  lead to the loss o f  a ship for speculators as w ell as genuine  
buyers w ere active in the m arket.14
Irish Shipping was in fact offered a 100% profit on one of its ships within hours of 
purchase. Further problems were caused by the fact that each ship was required to carry 
both a warrant and a navicert, and this brought Irish Shipping into the political arena as 
is shown by department of industry and commerce papers:
from the beginning o f  August 1940 the British m inistry o f  shipping introduced the ship warrants 
system , to ensure that shipping not directly under allied control w ould  be restrained from  
carrying any trade prejudiced to the allied war effort. Thereafter warrants w ere procured for 
ships w hich Irish Shipping Ltd w ished to acquire only w ith the utm ost difficulty and much  
con cess ion .15
This meant, in effect that the British had the power of veto over any ship Irish Shipping 
wished to purchase. By refusing to grant a warrant the ship would be in practical terms 
useless to the Irish, with this power being used in many instances to deprive the Irish of 
vital shipping, arguably in an effort to force them into the war on the allied side. The 
navicert system was introduced in January 1941 and was supposedly a passport that 
would exempt ships from examination and subsequent delay. In reality it was a means 
of controlling neutral shipping and denying its use to Germany. Without a navicert a 
ship could not pass through allied ports or receive fuel or stores and so this system 
could be used to put pressure on Irish Shipping Ltd and consequently on the Irish 
government. The view that the system of warrants and naciverts was being used as an 
economic weapon was recognised by the Irish government at this time:
recently the British have been using this system  to prevent us obtaining certain supplies from 
neutral sources, even  though there was no question o f  asking for shipping or other facilities from  
the B ritish .. .the British attempt to justify  their action by saying that these were com m odities are 
in short supply. The result is that the navicert system  is being turned into an econom ic w eapon to 
squeeze us out o f  obtaining these supplies in neutral countries.16
The records of the department of foreign affairs are filled with examples o f refusal by
14 Statement by the chairman at the first ordinary general m eeting (N .A . D ept o f  the taoiseach S14329).
15 Shipping, report on difficulties encountered on outbreak o f  war in 1939 (N .A . Dept o f  industry and 
com m erce papers EHR73/16).
16 M emorandum for government, supplies from abroad (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11).
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the British to grant warrants to Irish Shipping as is shown in a statement by John 
Leydon, the chairman of the company, ‘I pointed out to Mr. Jenkins17 that they are 
refusing warrants for all our applications now and that they apparently want to keep for 
themselves any ship that is of any practical use. He said that unfortunately this is so . ’ 18 
The feeling was still held in Ireland however that the British were being discriminatory 
in their allocation of warrants. During 1941 attempts were made to obtain warrants for 
Norwegian and Italian ships which were tied up in French Atlantic ports. The British 
refused stating that those ships did not fall within the category in respect of which 
warrants could be given. 19 The Irish government later learned that the Portuguese had 
been granted warrants for a number o f ships in similar circumstances and although a 
protest was lodged about the British decision it had little effect. Similar attempts were 
made in 1943 to gain warrants for Norwegian vessels that were tied up in Gothenburg. 
The British responded that these vessels could not be acquired as either Norwegian or 
German permission would be denied, though when pressed to give their attitude in the 
event that permission could be obtained, they refused to grant warrants in any 
circumstances. The view continued to be held in Ireland however that the British were 
biased in their allocation of warrants, as can be seen in the case of the ss Ergo, a Finnish 
ship which Irish Shipping attempted to charter. The British imposed a number of 
restrictive financial preconditions on Irish Shipping Ltd before a warrant would be 
granted, which resulted in the ship being chartered to Switzerland. This led to a request 
from the department of supplies to the Charge d ’Affaires in Berne to 'ascertain whether 
the British have insisted on the same conditions in issuing a ship warrant to the Swiss.'20 
In many instances where the British agreed to grant warrants, strict preconditions were
17 T.G. Jenkins, Ministry o f  war, London
18 M emorandum for governm ent from John Leydon, 12 Sept 1941 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /164).
19 Shipp ing-report on d ifficulties encountered on outbreak o f  war in 1939 (N .A . D ept o f  industry and 
com m erce papers E H R /3/16).
20 M em o to charge d ’affaires Berne, 1 Jan 1943 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /2 ).
12
imposed. In some instances it was stipulated that fifty percent, or in extreme cases, up to 
seventy-five percent of a ship’s cargo capacity would be granted to the British, making 
it inevitable that the ships would be highly unprofitable to run, thus forcing the Irish to 
withdraw from purchase or charter. Irish Shipping Ltd attempted to find ways around 
this, proposing the acquisition of two ships of equivalent tonnage each o f which was 
subject to a fifty percent service condition. One of these would then be chartered to the 
British ministry of war transport, trading under the British flag, with the other being
. « 9 1  • •reserved for the sole use of Irish Shipping. However the difficulties in chartering one 
ship, let alone two, coupled with the danger of financial loss as a result of the ship under 
the British flag being sunk, made this plan unfeasible in most instances.
Aside from the problems in obtaining warrants and navicerts, Irish Shipping Ltd 
faced many other difficulties in obtaining ships. One possible source of ships, which the 
company had hoped to exploit, was the United States, yet even here they ran into 
unexpected difficulties. Shortly after the formation of the company the minister of co­
ordination of defensive measures, Frank Aiken, was sent to the United States on a 
diplomatic mission to examine the possibility of purchasing food and supplies. This 
mission was to be dogged by problems however. While en route to America, Aiken was 
reported to have said that he favoured a German victory, while the British informed the 
state department that the purpose of Aiken’s visit was to mobilise support for Irish 
neutrality. The American minister in Dublin, David Gray, had also sent a letter to the 
secretary of state creating an unfavourable impression of Aiken, stating that he 'lives in
  99
a dream world...dependent on the British for nothing.' Further difficulties emerged 
after Aiken’s meeting with Roosevelt with Aiken’s dogged defence o f Irish
21 M emorandum for governm ent from department o f  supplies, 17 Sept 1941 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 
206/164).
22 J.L. R osenberg, ‘The 1941 m ission o f  Frank A iken to the U nited States: an Am erican perspective’ in 
IHS, vo l xx ii (1980), p. 165.
neutrality infuriating Roosevelt to the point where he upset a table in rage. Although 
the Americans agreed to sell two ships to Ireland, the offer was made directly to De 
Valera with Aiken being snubbed. Relations between the two countries had nevertheless 
been greatly strained. These two ships, the West Neris and the West Hematite, renamed 
Irish Oak and Irish Pine respectively, were, the only ships acquired by Irish Shipping in 
the United States during the war, partially as a result o f the deteriorating relations 
between the two countries. The Irish did receive many offers o f ships from the United 
States, as a letter from the Atlas Company Inc of Massachusetts directly to de Valera 
illustrates: 'we are in close touch with the maritime situation and have information and 
access to boats of one thousand to ten thousand tonnes that are to be had, but it is not 
known that these are on the market to be sold.” 24 The motives behind this offer seem to 
have been wholly noble and not profit-driven with inflated prices as was the case with 
many other offers:
w e offer to place this information and service at no cost to  you except w hen purchases in these 
lines are made and then at only the cost o f  handling. This offer is made because o f  our interest in 
the cause o f  our ancestors and in the hope w e can in som e sm all way help the nation w e love  
next to A m erica.25
The Irish consul in New York also received offers of ships for sale from the Andrew 
Bernstein Shipping Company, however, Irish Shipping Ltd felt it would have problems 
financing these deals, 'we are definitely interested in buying ships in the United States. 
Difficulty is foreign exchange. Our foreign exchange resources would be insufficient 
without new dollar credits.'26 A number of offers of ships were also vetoed by the 
American government for differing reasons prior to and after the country's entry into the 
war. The United States Lines, for example, offered eight ships to the Norwegian 
government, prior to the German invasion, whereby sixty per cent o f the capital would
23 T R yle D w yer, Irish neutrality and the USA (Dublin, 1977), p .l 13.
24 Letter to E. de Valera from the Atlas Com pany Inc, 7 Feb 1941 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206/60).
25 ibid.
26 Letter from F.H. Boland to Sean Leydon, 18 April 1941 (N -A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60).
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be held by the Norwegians and the remainder by the United States Lines. The 
Norwegian government blocked this arrangement as they saw it as an evasion of the 
United States neutrality act. It was anticipated that the United States Lines would then 
try to come to a similar arrangement with an Irish group, however, Irish officials 
believed that
the German governm ent w ould be opposed to the arrangement, because they were satisfied that 
what the United States L ines had in mind w as to acquire the right to use a neutral flag for the 
purpose o f  putting their vessels outside the scope o f  the neutrality act thus m aking it possib le to 
resum e direct sailings betw een U .S. and British ports.27
The American government was also aware of the use o f this tactic as an article in the
Manchester Guardian regarding the transfer of American ships to the Panamanian flag 
highlights:
the feeling appears to be strong that the schem e was a device for evading the terms o f  the 
neutrality laws under w hich Am erican ships m ay not travel to ‘com bat zo n es’ and m ight have 
serious consequences. I f  an attempt were made to transfer the ship to the Irish flag or to that o f
any other European neutral nation the objection w ould be even  stronger.28
Although American objections to the acquisition of ships in this manner seems 
reasonable they adopted a much tougher approach after their entry into the war in 
December 1941.
In 1943, Robert Brennan, the Irish minister in Washington, was instructed to 
explore the possibility of obtaining further shipping from the United States, citing the 
improvement in the shipping position of the allies and the adverse effect the lack o f  
shipping was having on agricultural exports to Britain and, consequently, the British 
was effort as reasons for such a request. In particular Irish Shipping was interested in 
acquiring the ss Wolverine which was under charter to the United States war shipping 
administration. The U.S. state department denied the application for this sale as 'not 
being in the interests of the United States.'29 However, a letter from David Gray in early
27 Letter from R.C. Ferguson to Sean Leydon, 25 Jan 1940 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60).
28 Manchester Guardian, 16 N o v  1939 view ed in (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60).
29 Letter from D. Gray, 6 Jan 1944 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11).
15
1944 revealed the real reasons behind these refusals. The Irish Pine and Irish Oak, the
two ships chartered from the United States, had been lost in 1942 and 1943 respectively 
and although belligerent action was suspected, no protest could be made due to lack of 
information and evidence.30 The Americans used this fact as a pretext to deny use of any 
further shipping to the Irish as is indicated in Gray’s letter:
so far the American governm ent is informed the Irish governm ent has taken no steps against the 
axis governm ents and thus far has offered no word o f  protest to the axis governm ents against 
these wanton acts. T hese repeated attacks on Irish ships appear to be conclusive proof, i f  further 
proof were needed, that the axis powers are in fact m aking war upon Ireland w hile, at the same 
tim e, using Ireland’s friendship to the detriment o f  the united nations war e ffo r t...A n y  further 
ships transferred to the Irish flag w ould be subjected to the sam e hazards. In v iew  o f  the 
foregoing circum stances it is regretted that the state department cannot com ply w ith your request 
regarding the sale in question.31
This view was not admitted officially in the U.S. as a memo from F.H. Boland 
indicates:
I had an informal talk with the Under Secretary today and went over entire ground. He was 
anxious to avoid d iscussion re Gray’s m essage. He said war-shipping board refused ‘W olverine’ 
because o f  essential need o f  every boat they have at this tim e.32
However, Gray’s explanation infuriated Irish officials who regarded it as yet another 
attack on neutrality: 'the new communication, can have no other purpose than to express 
the spleen of Roosevelt and his minister here against Ireland for not having surrendered
i n
to their attempts to bring us into the war.1
It was not just the British and Americans who caused problems with relation to 
the acquisition of shipping as the Germans also had an agenda o f their own. In 1944 
Irish Shipping Ltd was offered the Ceylon by Swedish authorities on condition that it 
would continue to operate under the Swedish flag and with a Swedish crew. The British 
agreed to supply the necessary warrant and navicert. The Germans objected, however, 
stating that
30 See A ppendix II
31 Letter from D. Gray, 6 Jan 1944 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11 ).
32 Letter from F.H. Boland to Sean Leydon, 7 Feb 1944 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11 ).
33 ‘Attitude o f  the U .S. toward the sale o f  ships to Ireland (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11).
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G erm any’s enem ies did not allow  ships to pass from areas under their control to areas controlled  
by Germany and in consequence the German governm ent cou ld  not agree to the transfer o f  ships 
from waters controlled by them to waters controlled by the en em y.34
Although the Irish accepted this as a valid reason they were more upset by Germany’s 
refusal to recognise the purchase of the Caterina Gerolimich. This ship had been in 
Dublin since 1940, unable to leave as she would have been sunk or captured by the 
British once outside Irish territorial waters due to her Italian registration. Irish Shipping 
Ltd had been attempting to negotiate the purchase or charter of the ship for over two 
years but the deal had been delayed by a number of unresolved issues. Firstly the 
Italians wanted the crew of the Caterina Gerolimich repatriated and although the British 
agreed to this, on condition that an equal number of British seamen would be released 
from internment in Italy, there were further delays as the Italians wanted port dues 
waived for the period the ship was tied up in Dublin while Irish Shipping claimed this 
was a matter for the port authorities and out of their control. Finally there were 
arguments over price which was related to tonnage. The Irish regarded the ship as 7950 
tonnes based on 1016 kilograms per tonne while the Italians regarded it as 8077 tonnes 
based on 1000 kilograms per metric tonne. In June 1943 Irish Shipping Ltd succeeded 
in chartering the ship but the German government refused to recognise the transfer of 
the flag as, under the terms of the charter, the ship had to be returned to the Italians 
within three to six months of an armistice. The German authorities rightly feared that if 
the Italians signed an armistice with the allies, all Italian shipping would be 
requisitioned, and the Caterina Gerolimich would fall into British hands. Irish Shipping 
therefore felt it necessary to keep the ship in port for a six month period after the charter 
until assurances of the ship’s safety could be obtained from Germany. Assurances had 
also to be gained from the American government that the vessel would not be subject by 
them to capture or to prizecourt proceedings by reason o f the change of the flag to that
34 Conditions o f  grant o f  British ships warrants for vessels (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /164).
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of Ireland. This assurance was given on condition that no more than twelve per cent of 
the purchase price o f the vessel would be available to the Italian government in any one 
year. In response to the continuing threat from Germany, a strongly worded protest was 
sent to the German government:
i f  w e are deprived o f  use o f  this ship w e m ay have to ration bread and German governm ent m ay  
be subject to severest criticism for having made this final and quite unnecessary attack on our 
supplies position. Urge officia l foreign office  to revise at once this decision  w hich  m ust other 
w ise  be brought to notice o f  parliament. Public opinion m ay then force governm ent to reconsider 
the w hole question o f  relations with Germ any.35
In response to this Hempel, the German minister in Ireland, stated on 16 October 1943 
that:
the German governm ent is prepared not to object to the intended putting to sea o f  the Italian 
steam ship Caterina Gerolomich under the Irish flag. The German consent w ith the putting to sea  
o f  the ship for the Irish w heat supplies does not mean the recognition o f  the sale or charter 
conditions particularly not the clause concerning the return o f  the ship six months after 
arm istice.36
As can be seen from these examples a vast amount of political wrangling and 
negotiation took place before any ship could sail under the Irish flag. Despite these 
difficulties Irish Shipping Ltd managed to secure a total of sixteen ships during the 
war.37 Yet although the acquisition of ships proved difficult, the running o f the company 
in a wartime situation was to prove equally so.
35 M em o to the Irish legation, Berlin, (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 2 0 6 /106  A).
36 Letter from German legation, Dublin, 16 Oct 1943 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 2 06 /106A ).
37 See A ppendix I
O p e ra t in g  W ith in  th e  B o u n d s  o f  N e u t r a lity .
C h a p t e r  I I
One of the biggest problems facing Irish Shipping Ltd, after the acquisition of 
ships, was the issue of the sailing instructions to be issued to their captains. Although 
under international law neutral ships could be stopped and searched by belligerent 
powers, they were exempt from attack and unlawful interference. The reality was 
somewhat different, however, as ships sailing in convoy or carrying armaments were 
always subject to attack, as U-boats could not take the risk o f surfacing to identify them. 
This led to a difficult problem for Irish Shipping: should ships sail unarmed and out of 
convoy, relying on the goodwill of the belligerent powers for their safe passage, or 
should they sail in protected Allied convoys, depending on military protection from 
attack?
At the outset the company had no official policy regarding sailing instructions 
for its ships: ‘in the early months of our operation we issued no special sailing 
instructions and the masters of our ships in the exercise of their discretion, invariably 
sailed in convoy. ’38 The issue o f sailing instructions was not simply a matter of 
company policy, though, as it also had implications for Irish neutrality and therefore 
was debated before the Dâil on several occasions. This was a problem which arose for 
the government even before the formation o f Irish Shipping and the policy which was 
put forward at the outbreak of war was largely adhered to throughout the conflict. In 
February 1941 James Dillon of Fine Gael raised the issue o f protesting against the 
German naval blockade and installing defensive armaments on Irish ships, after 
repeated attacks by German aircraft on shipping in the Irish sea. De Valera replied that 
in past wars many states found the only effective solution against the threat of a 
blockade was to prohibit their ships from sailing to the blockaded ports and that even in 
the present conflict this tactic had been adopted by the United States. On the issue of 
arming merchant ships he stated:
38 Statement by the chairman to the members at the first ordinary general m eeting, 17 D ec 1942 (N .A .
D ept o f  the taoiseach papers S 14329).
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the governm ent is not satisfied that the advantages o f  installing defensive armaments on Irish 
ships w ould outw eigh the disadvantages, instead o f  obliviating such incidents as have occurred it 
w ould serve to make them more frequent, thereby increasing the danger to Irish life and
39property.
This issue came before the dail again on 3 April 1941 to which Mr de Valera gave a 
similar response, adding however, that due to recent attacks on Irish ships the policy 
was being reconsidered. It is unlikely though that serious consideration was given to 
this issue, as the arming of merchant ships was regarded by many as being outside the 
bounds of neutrality. As Sean MacEntee, the minister for industry and commerce stated
The arming o f  neutral merchant vessels w ould be contrary to the interests o f  the country's 
neutrality .. .  a neutral merchant vessel w hich opens fire on a belligerent aircraft or submarine, 
from w hich it apprehends an attack, com m its an act o f  piracy i f  the gun and gun crews are 
provided by the owners o f  the vesse l w ithout offic ia l approval. T hey w ould  be com m itting an act 
o f  war i f  the guns are provided with official approval.40
Another factor, which undoubtedly influenced the government’s stance in relation to 
the arming of merchant ships, was a German radio broadcast transmitted to Ireland in 
May 1942 in response to newspaper reports that neutral ships were arming themselves. 
This broadcast stated that:
Ships w hich are not at war with Germany have nothing to fear from German units outside the 
declared zone o f  operations i f  they keep strictly w ithin their rights. T hey w ill not be attacked or 
m olested in any w ay by units o f  the German forces i f  they make th em selves clearly  
distinguishable as neutral vessels and have their markings distinctly v isib le  by night. I f  they do 
not fo llow  a z igzag  course or adopt m easures w hich  confuse them  w ith the enem y, i f  they do not 
travel in convoy and accept the recognised right o f  belligerents to halt and search them , outside 
the area o f  operations. I f  such ships arm them selves how ever, they convey  the im pression that 
resistance w ill be offered to German units, they surrender the characteristics o f  a peaceful 
merchantman and so place them selves outside the scope o f  international relations.41
Although this broadcast did not specifically mention Ireland it was clearly posted as a 
warning to the Irish government, among others, against the arming o f merchant ships. In 
March 1943 Alfred Byrne, an independent TD, suggested seeking assurances from 
Germany for the uninterrupted passage o f Irish ships to which de Valera replied ‘neutral 
ships carrying neutral cargoes have a right to travel freely and safely. I do not see why
39 Dail debates, vo l.81 , 20 Feb 1941, col.2320.
40 Robert Fisk, In time o f  war (London, 1983), p.275.
41 German radio broadcast to Ireland, 31 M ay 1942 Transcript v iew ed  in (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 
306/1).
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we should seek guarantees about something to which we are entitled in international law 
and I do not think any useful purpose would be served by doing so .’42 A memorandum 
prepared by the department of external affairs for de Valera on this matter indicates that 
the German government did seek to make an agreement with the Irish government, but 
were rejected by officials in Dublin:
in A ugust 1940 they offered to make a special agreem ent w ith us w hereby our ships w ould  enjoy  
defacto immunity. For reasons o f  policy  and principle w e did not take advantage o f  this offer. 
W e have alw ays maintained the attitude that our ships are entitled as a right to navigate freely  
and safely and that the German blockade measures cannot legally  apply to them .43
A change in company practice came about in September 1941 when the crew of 
the Irish Poplar, which was docked in Lisbon, refused to sail in a British convoy. 
According to Frank Forde ‘this decision was influenced by the arrival in Lisbon o f the 
surviving ships of convoy OG 71, which included the Limerick-registered Laharone. 
Her crew told of how in a seven-day battle, ten ships were sunk, one being the Limerick 
steamship company’s Clonlaral44 As a result o f this protest by the crew and, with 
governmental approval, from September 1941 onwards all Irish Shipping vessels sailed 
out of convoy. This move had the added benefit, for the company, of reducing the 
duration of a round trip between Ireland and the United States, thus increasing the 
number of voyages undertaken and consequently increasing the volume of commodities 
imported into Ireland. Although the decision to sail out of convoy brought benefits in 
terms of voyage time it also brought unforeseen difficulties as in February 1942 the 
crew o f the Irish Poplar refused to leave Halifax unless they were paid a bonus for 
sailing out of convoy. As a result each crewman was paid a productivity bonus due to 
the increased number of sailings that were made.
The biggest problem facing the company, once the decision to sail out of convoy
42 Bail debates, vol. 89, 24  March 1943, col. 1338.
43 M emorandum for the m inister o f  external affairs (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
44 Frank Forde, The long watch (Dublin, 1981), p.37.
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was made, was to ensure that all its vessels were clearly identifiable as neutral merchant 
ships. As well as flying the Irish flag, the company’s vessels had the word ‘EIRE’ and 
the Irish flag clearly painted on both sides of the hull, as well as on the decks, to make 
identification easier for aircraft. Floodlights were also installed on all Irish ships to 
make identification possible at night. Despite the fact that these measures were 
undertaken solely to ensure the safety of the ships involved, they met with some 
hostility, particularly in allied shipping circles, as this Canadian newspaper report 
indicates:
ducks in death valley w ould be no more out o f  place than are Eire freighters here, their fresh coat 
o f  paint and blazing deck light looking at least three years outdated beside the dirty grey, blacked  
out merchant ships o f  the united nations ... O nce outside the harbour gates they are shunned by  
the shipping o f  the united nations. Depending on bright orange, green and w hite flags painted on 
their sides, illum inated by searchlights for protection instead o f  guns and ships o f  war, these 
freighters are given a w ide berth by convoys in w hich death is often the penalty for show ing as 
much as a match flare.45
This report can be viewed as yet another indication of allied hostility to the Irish policy 
of neutrality, as reflected in the operation of Irish Shipping. When sailing out o f convoy 
the Irish ships were obliged to follow certain routes reserved for neutral vessels in an 
effort to prevent them being mistaken for allied merchantmen which had fallen out of 
convoy. The routes to be followed by neutral vessels were laid down by the allies and in 
some instances were the cause of disputes as Irish officials believed they were being 
allocated unnecessarily long routes:
our transatlantic tonnage is severely lessened b y  the roundabout routes w hich w e are constrained  
to follow . W ithin the last year w e have been given  a route w hich  brings our vesse ls  dow n to a 
point southw est o f  the A zores and across the Atlantic at that latitude. O w ing to our com pliance  
w ith that requirement the effective cargo carrying capacity o f  our transatlantic tonnage has 
decreased by about one third.46
This was viewed in Irish circles as yet another obstructionist tactic on behalf o f the 
allies, designed to put unnecessary pressure on Irish Shipping Ltd and consequently on 
Irish neutrality.
45 Halifax Daily Star, 16 Jan 1943 view ed  in (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
46 Letter to the Irish m inister in W ashington, 7 Jan 1944 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /60 /11).
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As well as taking the above precautions, which were observed by most neutral 
vessels, the Irish government took the additional step o f sending thorough lists o f the 
identifying features of Irish Shipping Ltd’s vessels to the German authorities, which 
included everything from the dimensions of each ship to the colour of their funnels.47 
T he German authorities were also informed o f any irregular shipping routes which were 
to be followed as the following information passed to the German legation in Dublin 
illustrates:
The ss Irish Poplar w ill leave Rushbrooke, Cork, on the 26 th April for G eorgetow n, British 
Guiana, (where she w ill pick up a consignm ent o f  sugar and a sm all consignm ent o f  greenheart 
timber) and St Kitts (where she w ill bunker and pick up more sugar) She is due at G eorgetow n  
on approxim ately the 2 0 lh M ay, w ill depart from St Kitts on approxim ately the 28 th and the round 
trip is expected to take about 60 days.48
Despite the volume and detail of information the German authorities were receiving 
they refused to accept any responsibility for the safety o f Irish ships as this Irish 
Government memo indicates:
Herr H em pel made it clear that the legation could not accept any responsibility for notification  
routes addressed to it. I f  he had suggested that the notifications should be addressed to our 
legation at Berlin he had done so parenthetically and unofficia lly  and it had certainly not been 
his intention to suggest that i f  notifications were sent through the legation at Berlin 10 or 12 days 
in advance the German governm ent guaranteed or accepted responsibility for the ships involved  
in the blockade zon e.49
The Irish government respected the German government’s stance on this issue but 
continued to forward information regarding special voyages or deviations from the 
general route throughout the war.
One further precaution taken by Irish Shipping to ensure the safety of its fleet 
was to have every ship degaussed as a protection against magnetic mines, which posed a 
threat particularly in European coastal waters. These mines were dropped from aircraft, 
by both sides, into the water, resting on the seabed until activated by a ship’s magnetic 
field at which point they rose to the surface and exploded. The Irish sea in particular
47 See A ppendix III.
48 Letter to H Tom sen, German legation Dublin, 14 M ay 1943 (N .A  Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
49 Letter to Irish legation Berlin, (N .A . Berlin em bassy papers 48 /11).
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was littered with magnetic mines, but the fact that they were not securely anchored in 
place meant that many of them were carried into Irish coastal waters by sea currents. 
There were two methods of degaussing, the wiping method, which was suitable only for 
smaller vessels on coastal journeys, and the coiling method, which was used on most 
larger, ocean-going vessels. The coiling method, which was that used on most o f the 
Irish Shipping fleet, involved fitting coils o f cable horizontally inside the ship and 
passing current through them in an effort to neutralise the ship’s magnetic field. 
Although the British ministry o f shipping agreed to supply the formula for degaussing 
to the Irish government, the necessary materials and cable were often unavailable, 
resulting in the work having to be carried out in Britain. This often resulted in further 
delays for the company, as the British ministry o f shipping only agreed to carry out the 
degaussing procedure if  it did not delay the degaussing o f British ships. Attempts were 
made to have the Irish Oak and the Irish Pine degaussed in the United States after their 
purchase there, but it was found that the process was not popular there as most magnetic 
mines were found only in European coastal waters, an area which American ships were 
prohibited from entering until after the United States joined the conflict.
Despite these attempts made to ensure the safety of Irish Shipping Ltd’s fleet 
and to ensure that it adequately operated within the bounds of, and reflected the 
governments policy o f neutrality, a number of problems came to light that both 
threatened the safety of the ships and impinged on Irish neutrality. One of the most 
important among these was the issue of belligerent ships, which in reality were mostly 
British, flying the Irish flag in an effort to disguise their true identity. This issue first 
came to light as early as 1939 when a report was received from the German legation in 
Dublin concerning vessels flying the Irish flag off the coast of Scandinavia and the 
Iberian peninsula.50 This report stated that there was reason to doubt whether the vessels
50 Letter to Dr N olan from N  S (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
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in question were of genuine Irish registry and requested that the German legation in 
Dublin should be supplied with all information regarding the markings o f Irish 
registered ships on these routes. The practice by belligerents of flying the Irish flag was 
also common around Irish coastal waters, with the flag being hauled down once inside 
Irish territorial limits. This practice was brought to the attention of the department of 
external affairs on numerous occasions, again with British-registered ships being among 
the main culprits, and it was suggested that ‘appropriate action should be taken to 
prevent such incidents as this happening, if  they are allowed to continue it can only 
have the effect of leaving our own vessels open to much greater risks than those which 
they are at present experiencing. ’51 In May 1942, the Irish Elm while en route to 
Ireland, reported seeing an armed merchant ship zigzagging and flying the Irish flag
STabout six hundred miles off the American coast. The Irish Elm signalled the ship 
‘what’s wrong?’ to which it replied ‘have lost my convoy.’ As a result of incidents such 
as this the belief was held in shipping circles that British ships made a practice of 
raising the Irish flag if they got separated from their convoys and raising their own 
ensign again once they rejoined it. Although this issue did pose a threat to the safety of 
Irish ships and violated Irish neutrality there is no evidence that protests were made to 
the British admiralty. This issue also failed to cause widespread concern among the 
Irish crews as many experienced officers shared the views of Captain Henderson of the 
Irish Elm who stated that it was:
unlikely that the German pilots and submarine com m anders paid m uch attention to the flag. 
They relied on painted markings because they could not b e changed so easily . The crews regard 
the word EIRE painted in large lettering on the sides o f  the vesse ls as their main protection.54
51 Letter from M O ’Leary, com dt adjutant Curragh com m and to J P W alshe, D ept o f  external affairs, 
M ay 1941 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
52 A llied  merchant ships sailed in a z igzag  pattern in an effort to prevent U  boats getting an accurate fix 
on their position, thus reducing the chances o f  being hit by a torpedo. Neutral ships w ere advised not to 
fo llow  this pattern as it drew unnecessary suspicion  upon them.
53 Particulars re Irish registered vesse ls on A tlantic routes (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
54 U ntitled docum ent, 4  June 1942 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 306/1).
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It was not only violations of Irish neutrality by foreign powers that jeopardised 
Irish ships and lives. The Irish government also received complaints regarding Irish 
ships behaving in a manner which was in violation of international neutrality 
regulations. In February 1943 a Warning to masters of ships was issued by the 
department of industry and commerce, which stated that:
masters o f  ships and other craft and ow ners o f  fishing vesse ls  are warned, in their ow n interest, 
to g ive as w ide as possib le a berth to any surface or air operations o f  a warlike nature w hich they 
may observe in their v icin ity and in particular not to approach or interfere w ith any floating  
object connected with such operations55
This warning was issued after complaints by the British authorities that an Irish trawler 
had extinguished flares used to mark the position of a U-boat in an effort to prevent the 
flares from burning its nets. The British admiralty stated that ‘if British air or surface 
craft are attacking a U-boat, they will not desist from doing so simply because the 
continuance of their attacks might mean sinking or damaging an Irish vessel which 
might be near. ’56 This warning clearly had severe implications for Irish Shipping and 
put further pressure on the company to ensure its operations were carried out in a 
strictly neutral manner.
Of more serious importance to Irish Shipping was an allegation made by the 
German naval authorities that some of the company’s own ships were operating in 
violation of neutrality laws. In June 1943 the Irish legation in Berlin received a 
complaint that the ‘Irish Rose when sighted by a submarine on 19 April was sailing on a 
zigzag course. Another Irish ship (name not given) observed sailing zigzag on 26 May.
- -  • • S7 •Neutral ships in their own interests should sail a straight course.’ This was a fully 
justified complaint on behalf of the Germans, particularly in light o f their radio 
broadcast on 31 May 1942 warning against ‘surrendering the characteristics of a
55 W arning to masters o f  ships issued by department o f  industry and com m erce, February 1943 (N .A . 
Foreign affairs papers 306/13).
56 ibid
57 Telegram  sent from Berlin via Berne to Dublin, 11 June 1943 (N .A . Berlin em bassy papers 48 /11).
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peaceful merchantman. ’58 However, the allegation was firmly denied by the Irish 
government and the crew of the Irish Rose. The Irish government replied:
w e should be surprised i f  your reports are accurate. A ll Irish ships have categorical instructions 
to sail in a straight course and to avoid any kind o f  unneutral or suspicious activity. Our 
experience is that in the interests o f  their ow n safety masters o f  ships are on ly  too w illing  to 
com ply with these instructions.59
The captain and officers of the Irish Rose also denied the allegation and suggested that 
when fully laden the ship could be difficult to steer and an inexperienced helmsmen 
might occasionally swing a point or a point and a half off course. Despite isolated
complaints such as these, German units, for the most part, respected Irish neutrality, and 
although Irish ships were frequently stopped for identification, they were rarely 
unlawfully interfered with.
‘Captain Henderson had nothing to report of his homeward voyage but stated 
that while outward bound to Halifax the Irish Plane was signalled by an unidentified 
submarine which on receipt of the vessel’s name and destination allowed the vessel to 
proceed. ’60 This report is only one example of the many occasions on which Irish ships 
were stopped by U-boats during the war, with perhaps the best documented incident 
being the stopping of the Irish Willow on 16 March 1942. At 1:40 p.m. the ship, 
travelling from Ardrossan to St John, sighted a submarine on the surface about five 
miles away. All crewmen were ordered on deck with lifejackets on, while the wireless 
operator was given orders that the transmitter must not be used without further notice as 
any unauthorised radio transmissions could be perceived as a call for assistance by the 
German submarine commander and therefore lead to an immediate attack. The Irish 
Willow continued at the same speed and course until a shot was fired across her bows, at
58 German radio broadcast to Ireland, 31 M ay 1942 transcript v iew ed in (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 
306/1).
59 Irish governm ent service personnel, 5 July 1943 (N .A . Berlin em bassy papers 48 /11).
60 Letter from M  G uilfoyle D ept o f  defence to ? (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206 /1 8 2 )
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which point the engines were stopped. The submarine then signalled with a lamp, 
requesting the name of the ship and the captain. Further signals were indistinguishable 
due to the distances involved. At 3 p.m. the captain o f the Irish Willow ordered a 
lifeboat to row across to the submarine with the ship's papers. Upon inspection of the 
papers the German commander stated that although the papers appeared to be in order 
he had no instructions regarding the Irish Willow. He ordered the lifeboat to return to 
the ship with instructions not to use the engine or radio under any circumstances and 
stated that in two hours he would either fire a gun, which would be a warning to 
abandon ship as the Irish Willow was to be sunk, or he would fire red, white and green 
rockets which would indicate the vessel could proceed. The German commander also 
expressed his regrets in the event the ship would have to be sunk. At 6  p.m. the 
submarine fired red, white and green rockets and the ship was allowed to continue on its 
way. The official report on this incident noted that ‘both the submarine and the Irish 
Willow acted in accordance with international law .’61
Undoubtedly the steps taken by Irish Shipping to ensure their vessels behaved, 
and were easily identifiable, as neutral vessels, prevented many tragedies during the 
war. However, despite this fact and the fact that on most occasions, as in the case of the 
Irish Willow cited above, German naval units behaved legally and within their rights, 
there were a number of attacks on Irish vessels which resulted in major diplomatic 
incidents.
61 Report by Captain Shanks o f  the Irish Willow on the stopping o f  h is ship by a German submarine on 
16 March 1942 (N .A . Foreign affairs papers 206/182).
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‘A n  A t ta c k  o n  o u r  In d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  V it a l  In te re s ts . ’
C h a p t e r  I I I
The ss Irish P ine  (5621 tons gross) one o f  the m ost m odem  ships operated by Irish Shipping Ltd 
is missing and presum ed lost. There is no news as we go to press o f  the crew o f  33 Cork, Dublin, 
Limerick, Louth and W exford m en who manned her on her last trip from D ublin.62
This was the news that greeted the nation on 5 December 1942. In late October the Irish 
Pine left Dublin bound firstly for Boston, to have repairs carried out on her fuel tanks, 
and then for Tampa to collect a cargo of phosphates. On 14 November she made radio 
contact with the Irish Fir and gave 17 November as the date for her arrival in Boston. 
Fears for the safety o f the ship began to grow when she failed to reach Boston by 18 
November and it was only when all hope was gone that an announcement was issued to 
the Irish newspapers. Surprisingly, this incident, which represented such a major loss to 
Ireland’s small but vital merchant fleet, received little coverage in the newspapers, due 
mainly to the pressures of wartime censorship. The Irish Times earned the 
announcement o f the ship’s loss on 5 December under the headline Irish Pine feared 
lost, no news of crew of 33 men. '63 The article which followed contained the statement 
issued by Irish Shipping:
Irish Shipping Ltd regrets to announce that the Irish P ine  is now  so considerably overdue at her 
transatlantic port o f  call that she m ust be presum ed lost. The com pany regrets that as o f yet there 
is no news o f the crew .64
The article also contained a history of the ship and a list of the crew. There were no 
further reports on the incident in the Irish Times in the following days or weeks. On 
Monday 7 December the Irish Press carried the headline 'No news o f Irish Pine’s 
crew1,65 followed by a small article which shed no further light on what had happened to 
the ship. On 8 December the paper carried a report on a meeting of the Maritime 
Institute of Ireland during which the crew of the Irish Pine and other Irish Shipping 
vessels were praised for their services to the country. The impact of wartime censorship
62 The Irish Press, 5 D ecem ber 1942, p .l .
63 The Irish Times, 5 Decem ber 1942, p .l.
64 ibid.
65 The Irish Press, 7 D ecem ber 1942, p .l .
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can clearly be seen in the reporting of the loss of the Irish Pine as no newspaper 
speculated on the cause of the loss, even though the probability of a U-boat attack must 
have been foremost in everyone’s minds. Similarly the incident was not discussed 
before the dail except in relation to the issue o f compensation for the dependants o f the 
crew, nor was there any protest to any of the belligerent powers as there was no 
evidence whatsoever as to the fate of the ship.66 It was not until the publication of The 
long watch by Frank Forde that the circumstances surrounding the loss of the Irish Pine 
were brought to light. Forde contends, after studying U-boat diaries brought to England 
at the end of the war, that the Irish Pine was sunk by U608 on 16 November 1942. 
According to Forde:
the w ar diary o f  U608 on 16 N ovem ber recorded the last eight hours o f  the Irish Pine, from 
Struckmeier's first sighting if  her at 3:10pm  when she appeared out o f  a snow squall ... 
Struckm eier m aintained contact all day but m ade no reference to seeing neutrality markings. At 
10:30pm central european tim e he made his attack67
The Irish Pine sank in just three minutes with no wreckage or bodies ever being found.
In contrast to the events surrounding the loss of the Irish Pine, the details o f the 
sinking of the Irish Oak were known in full almost immediately and although no lives 
were lost it had far greater consequences for the Irish government in terms of 
international relations. The Irish Oak, like the Irish Pine, was one of the ships leased by 
the American government to Ireland in 1941 and, as Frank Forde states
the sinking had w idespread repercussions, for in addition to the normal new spaper headlines, 
stories and interviews, the matter becam e an issue in the general election o f  1943, was discussed 
at Germ an naval headquarters in Berlin, raised as a question in the house o f  com m ons and 
caused an exchange o f  diplom atic notes between the Irish and U .S governm ents.68
In May 1943 the Irish Oak left Tampa, Florida, bound for Dublin with a cargo of 
phosphates. On 14 May a submarine was sighted sailing parallel to the Irish Oak but 
exchanged no signals and showed no identifying marks. Radio silence was maintained
66 See Appendix II.
67 Frank Forde, The long w atch  (Dublin, 1981), p.51.
68 ibid. p.56.
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on board the Irish Oak as smoke from an allied convoy could be seen in the distance. 
The submarine remained on the surface for about two hours before submerging and was 
not seen again. At 8:19am the following morning the Irish Oak was hit by a torpedo and 
immediately began transmitting a distress signal, which was picked up by the crew of 
the Irish Plane, which altered course towards the Irish Oak. The crew abandoned ship 
in two lifeboats and at 9:31 a second torpedo hit the Irish Oak, sinking her. At 4:20pm 
the Irish Plane rescued her crew, with only minor injuries being suffered, and they 
arrived safely in Cork on 19 May.
The sinking of the Irish Oak led to widespread condemnation in Dublin, though 
as the nationality of the submarine involved could not be proven the government had to 
ensure that, while being seen to openly condemn the attack, it did not appear to place 
blame on the shoulders of either belligerent side. As was the case with the sinking of the 
Irish Pine, the newspapers were strictly censored and only reported on the bare facts of 
what happened. Both the Irish Press and the Irish Times carried the story on 18 May. 
These reports, however, divulged little information: 'Irish Shipping Ltd announce with 
regret that from information which they have received it is feared that the ss Irish Oak 
has been lost. The crew are all safe. '69 On 19 May both papers ran a small article stating 
that the crew was safe and on its way home. It was not until 21 May that some details of 
what happened emerged with the Irish Press running the headline "Irish Oak was 
torpedoed’ while the following article stated that an 'unidentified submarine' torpedoed 
the vessel.70 This information was not reported in the Irish Times until 27 May 1943 
when under the headline 'Irish Oak sinking denounced by Mr de Valera’71 the 
newspaper carried a report of the dail debate on the matter and stated that two torpedoes
69 The Irish Times, 18 May 1943
70 The Irish Press, 21 May 1943
71 The Irish Times, 27 May 1943
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were fired at the ship. Again there was no comment on the facts or speculation as to the
nationality of the submarine involved.
Although wartime censorship prevented the newspapers from speculating on
what had happened or revealing any potentially controversial viewpoints regarding
these incidents, department of foreign affairs files, intended for internal circulation only,
are much more informative. The views expressed within these files indicate the true
feeling within the Irish government regarding these attacks:
In wanton disregard o f  our neutral rights we have lost one o f  the largest units o f  our small 
m erchant fleet. Small as our m erchant fleet m ay be, it is an essential bulw ark o f  our econom ic 
life and independence. On it we must depend, not only now  but also in the post war period, for 
everything which our own resources cannot give us. W anton attacks on our shipping such as that 
on the Irish Oak constitute therefore not merely an unw arrantable invasion o f  our neutral rights 
but a threat to our econom ic survival.72
This condemnation of the attack once again clearly illustrates the importance of Irish 
Shipping to Irish economic survival and consequently to Irish neutrality, as well as the 
grave manner in which violations of this neutrality were viewed. These authors of these 
documents also attempted to express the feelings of the country as a whole:
the Irish people feel proud o f  the crews who brave the dangers o f  torpedo and mine to bring 
them  the essential elem ents required to m ake up for what is lacking in our own raw  m aterials and 
industrial products. But they also feel indignant that a belligerent pow er should deliberately 
attack and destroy an Irish ship engaged on its com pletely lawful task o f  bringing essential 
cargoes to this country for the use o f  our own people. Such an attack is not m erely a violation o f 
our neutrality. It is an attack on our independence and vital interests. It has no m oral justification 
w hatsoever.73
These comments clearly indicate the depth of feeling that existed both in official and 
unofficial circles in Ireland in relation to the attack on the Irish Oak. Although feelings 
ran high, the government had to adhere to its policy o f neutrality and as the attacking 
submarine had not been positively identified no official protest could be made:
it is much to be regretted that the absence o f  identification makes it im possible for the 
governm ent to make a protest, but the belligerent responsible for the tragedy m ust be aware that 
the circum stances o f  the war at present being waged in the Atlantic inevitably arouses the 
greatest suspicion in the m inds o f  the Irish people as to the identity o f  the culprit. Such wanton
72 Untitled docum ent (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
73 ibid.
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attacks com m itted against a neutral country leave behind a legacy o f  anger and resentm ent w hich 
seriously add to the difficulties in the way o f  restoring international goodw ill.74
The failure to make an official protest soon became a major thorn in the government’s
side, firstly in domestic politics as de Valera, in his role as minister for external affairs,
was questioned on the matter in the dail, and secondly on the international front as the
United States used this issue to pressurise the government.
On 26 May 1943 James Dillon, the deputy leader o f Fine Gael, asked if the
submarine which fired the torpedo had followed the Irish Oak the previous day and had
been identified, to which de Valera replied:
a subm arine was seen on the previous day, which was identified not by any m arkings but by its 
general contour and silhouette, as a Germ an submarine. That was seen som etim e between 2:30 
and 5:30 the previous day. The subm arine was not seen after that. Therefore it is not possible to 
establish any connection between that particular subm arine and the one w hich fired the torpedo. 
There are more submarines than one o f  course, and it would be difficult to establish, w ithout 
direct proof, the connection that the deputy is trying to establish.75
This statement clearly indicates the difficulties faced by the Irish government. Although 
all evidence strongly pointed to German culpability, no protest could be issued without 
indisputable proof. As one department o f foreign affairs official put it:
so far as we have been able to ascertain, it is not the practice o f  neutral governm ents to make 
formal protests to a belligerent in a case such as this unless they have positive and irrefutable 
p roof o f  the belligerents responsibility. To do otherw ise is to  m erely invite a rebuff.76
The Irish, in adopting this policy, were clearly influenced by the case o f a Swedish ship 
sunk in the Baltic while carrying iron ore to Germany. The Swedish government came 
under considerable pressure from the press which argued that, since only German and 
Russian submarines were active in that region, and it was unlikely the Germans would 
sink a cargo destined for themselves, a Russian submarine must have sunk the ship. The 
Swedish government was coerced into making a protest to Moscow but this protest only
74 Untitled docum ent (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
75 D âil debates, vol. 92, 26 M ay 1943, col.538.
76 M em orandum  for the ministers information (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
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served to cause embarrassment for them as the Soviet foreign office refused to accept 
the protest and rejected it orally. The Swedish official statement said rather weakly that
77'it was proposed to make further investigations.1 From the precedent set by this the 
Irish concluded that
in practice there is no point in m aking a form al protest based on a m ere presum ption, how ever 
strong it m ay be, and the absence o f  form al identification as to the identity o f  the attacker may be 
said to rule out any question o f  a formal official protest.78
Although the Irish government stood firm in their belief that no protest could be 
made in these circumstances, the American government did not share this view. The 
United States held the opinion that there was enough evidence with regard to the 
sinking of the Irish Oak to issue a protest:
although no definite inform ation seems to be available regarding the sinking o f  the Irish P ine , 
the torpedoing o f  the Irish Oak appears to have been definitely established, as well as the fact 
that a Germ an subm arine was observed by the crew o f  the Irish Oak some hours prior to the 
sinking. The sinking o f  the Irish O ak  which you have rightly described as a "wanton and 
inexcusable act" and, o f  other Irish ships, m ust be presum ed in the absence o f  evidence to the 
contrary to be the w ork o f  axis subm arines79
The Irish minister in Washington, Robert Brennan, defended the governments actions 
stating that
the accusation that we had not protested to  Germ any was most unreasonable because such a 
protest could not be made without positive evidence. I instanced the case o f  the K erlogue which 
had been m achine gunned from the air and stated that a prem ature protest to  G erm any would 
have been ridiculous because it had lately been proved that the plane involved was British, and 
the British had adm itted the facts but denied responsibility because the vessel was o ff  course.80
The Irish authorities attempted to further justify their response in a document entitled 
Fixing responsibility for sinkings81 which was sent to the United States legation in 
Dublin. This document clearly outlined Irish policy in instances such as that o f the 
sinking of the Irish Oak and concluded by noting that the U.S followed a similar policy
77 M em orandum  for the ministers inform ation (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
78 ibid.
79 Letter from D  Gray, 6 Jan 1944 (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 206/60/11).
80 Frank Forde, The long watch  (Dublin, 1981), p.63.
81 See Appendix II.
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in the first world war. Despite these attempts by the Irish government to account for 
their position the absence of an official complaint to Germany was used by the 
Americans as a pretext by which to deny the use of further allied shipping to Ireland, as 
was discussed in chapter one, in an effort to make the policy of neutrality untenable.
The complication over the issue of a formal complaint was not the only problem 
caused for the government by the sinking of the Irish Oak. Perhaps a more serious 
allegation was that the British captain of the vessel, Captain Jones, had passed 
information to a nearby allied convoy that a German submarine had been sighted, the 
insinuation being that this action had instigated the attack on the Irish Oak. During the 
course of the dail debate on the incident Deputy Norton, Labour, asked the minister for 
external affairs, de Valera, if  he knew the nationality of the ship’s captain, to which the 
reply was negative. James Everett, Labour, then asked whether any information 
regarding the sighting of a German submarine had been passed to a British convoy, to 
which de Valera replied 'I am sure it was not ... it is not the business of our ships to
87 ■ 1 i 3give information to anybody.' Irish Shipping Ltd responded to this allegation by 
publishing a response in the Irish Independent on 28 May 1943:
In the course o f  a debate in dail Eireann on W ednesday, 26 M ay, a suggestion was made that the 
ss Irish O ak before being sunk had conveyed inform ation to a British convoy that a submarine 
had been sighted. The com pany states in the m ost em phatic manner that there is no foundation 
w hatever for this reckless and m ischievous suggestion. It is a m atter o f  surprise and regret to the 
com pany that it should have been suggested that any officer or m em ber o f  the crew  o f  one o f  the 
com pany's ships could be guilty o f  such reprehensible conduct involving, as it w ould, a very 
grave risk for the ship and for the lives o f  the crew .'83
This argument raged for some time and became an issue in the general election of June 
1943 with the Labour party criticising the government’s actions in the national 
newspapers on 19 June: ‘The government that raised taxation to £12 per head, that 
deported 150,000 Irish youths to work and fight for Britain, that placed a British
82 D ail debates, vol.92, 26 M ay 1943, col.540.
83 Statement issued by Irish Shipping Ltd, 28 M ay 1943 (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
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national in charge of the Irish Oak was also one hundred per cent Fianna Fail.’ The 
issue of whether a message was transmitted to an allied convoy was not just a domestic 
matter since it was also raised in the British house of commons on 8 June 1943. The 
difficulties that faced the government in maintaining their policy of neutrality can again 
be seen with regard to this matter. In Ireland the government was pressured as it was 
believed that the Irish Oak had sent a warning message to the convoy, while conversely 
on the international front complaints were made about the failure of the vessel to 
transmit a message. Sir William Davison asked the secretary of state for dominion 
affairs to protest the fact that although the Irish Oak knew a German submarine was in 
the vicinity of a British convoy no warning was given, and that as Eire was largely 
dependant on British shipping for much of its supplies, the government should be asked 
to notify British convoys in future in such circumstances. Mr Emrys-Evans, the 
dominions secretary, replied that though there was no communication between the Irish 
Oak and the submarine, in any case it would have served no purpose, as the convoy was 
fully aware of the situation. On the issue o f asking for notification in similar 
circumstances in future he added
the object o f  the statem ent by M r de V alera was no doubt to disperse any possible German 
allegation that the sinking by a Germ an subm arine o f  the Eire ship in question was justified  on 
the ground that it had given inform ation about G erm an subm arine m ovem ents. It would 
evidently be useless to ask the governm ent o f  Eire to authorise any action w hich they would 
consider unneutral.85
This was obviously an issue which was important to many in England as it was raised 
again on 23 June, with Francis Watt M.P. asking how many Allied ships had been lost 
conveying cargoes to Ireland. John Leslie M.P. also requested that steps be taken to 
ensure all exports and imports to and from Ireland be carried in Irish-owned or neutral
8 4
84 Frank Forde, The long watch  (Dublin, 1981), p.37.
85 Extract from British house o f  com mons debates official report, 8 June 1943 viewed in (N.A Foreign 
affairs papers 306/8/35).
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  or
vessels, in order to avoid the risks to British seamen. This indicates that after almost 
three years of war the British still were not reconciled to Irish neutrality and were 
continuing to use shipping as a means to pressurise the government.
German reaction to the sinking of the Irish Oak was one o f remorse and 
conciliation, without actually admitting responsibility. One of the main concerns of Irish 
officials, as the British had rightly guessed, was to ensure the Germans did not use the 
issue of Captain Jones’ nationality as justification for the attack, as a letter to the 
Charge d'Affaires in Berlin indicates:
Captain Jones was bom  in Liverpool. This is correct as a statem ent o f  fact but the deductions 
drawn from it and the insinuations made in connection with it are com pletely unjustifiable and 
w ithout foundation. Captain Jones spent alm ost his entire life on Irish ships and the suggestion 
that he w ould do anything prejudicial to the safety o f  his ship and crew and the interests o f  his
owners is ridiculous.87
The Irish legation was also urged to make an unofficial representation to the German 
authorities regarding the matter:
while not m aking any kind o f  official protest you should take advantage o f  any suitable 
opportunities which may present them selves to you in conversation w ith G erm an officials to 
speak to them  on the usual lines about the sinking o f  the Irish Oak, em phasising the resentm ent 
w hich such incidents cause here, the bad effect on our relations with Germ any, the harm  done to 
Germ any by the com parison inevitably instituted between the action o f  the United States in 
giving us this ship and the action o f  the Germ ans in sinking it.88
The German authorities accepted the line o f reasoning put forward by the Irish, and as 
Frank Forde states,
in Berlin Jeschonnek's action in sinking the Irish Oak was not well received. Flag officer U-boats 
said it ought not have happened, but under the circum stances could be attributed to an 
understandable m istake by an eager captain. He w ent on to  com m ent "the precise observance o f  
Irish neutrality and o f  all Flag officer U -boats strict orders in this connection is the duty o f  all U- 
boat captains and is in the most im m ediate and pressing interests o f  the G erm an Reich."89
Members o f the Irish legation in Berlin also sensed a certain amount of regret on the
86 Extract from  British house o f  com mons debates official reports, 23 June 1943, viewed in (N .A  Foreign 
affairs papers 306/8/35).
87 Letter to charge d'affaires Berlin 16 A ugust 1943, N.A. (Foreign affairs papers 306/8/35).
88 ibid.
89 Frank Forde, The long watch  (Dublin, 1981), p .37.
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part of the Germans regarding the incident and admiration for the crew of the ship who 
were praised for maintaining a neutral stance and not communicating with the allied 
convoy:
I beg to state that the incident caused a certain am ount o f em barrassm ent to the Foreign Office at 
the tim e ... The Germans were particularly im pressed by the correct attitude o f  the ships crew 
who made no attem pt to com m unicate with a nearby British convoy ... I have the im pression that 
the foreign office appreciates our point o f  view  in all these matters and that the various incidents 
w hich have taken place are due for the m ost part to lack o f  experience or carelessness on the part 
o f  the navy or air force officers concerned.90
This explanation was not fully accepted by all Irish officials, as some believed that the 
attacks were deliberate:
I have always believed that the reason for the sinking o f  the Irish Oak  and Irish P ine , the two 
vessels which we got from the A m erican governm ent, was that we m erely had these tw o ships on 
annual charter and that by refusing to renew the charters the A m ericans could get them back at 
any tim e.91
Although plausible, and likely to have further heightened emotions in Ireland at the 
time, this theory would seem to be dispelled by the German reaction to the sinking and 
their desire for Ireland to maintain her neutrality.
From the evidence at hand it would seem most likely that the attacks on the Irish 
Oak and Irish Pine were the result of inexperience or poor judgement on behalf of the 
individual German commanders involved, and not the result of an officially sanctioned 
strategy to eliminate the possibility o f the ships being returned to the American flag. 
Whatever the motivation behind these attacks, they had a considerable influence on 
Irish neutrality, not just in terms o f the shipping tonnage which was lost, but perhaps 
more importantly in terms of the political strife which they caused for the government.
90 Letter from  W  W am ock, Irish legation Berlin, to secretary, departm ent o f  external affairs, 30 O ct 1943 
(N.A. Berlin em bassy papers 48/16).
90Proposed purchase o f  Italian ship Caterina G erolomich  (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 206/106A).
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C o n c lu s io n
All the small states can do, if  the statesm en o f  greater states fail in their duty, is resolutely to 
determ ine that they will not becom e the tools o f  any great power, and that they will resist with 
w hatever strength they possess, every attem pt to force them  into a w ar against their w ill.92
This extract, from a speech made by de Valera to the league of nations in 1936, adopts 
added resonance when viewed in relation to Irish foreign policy during the second 
world war. Irish Shipping Ltd was one of the tools which the Irish government used to 
prevent the country being forced into the conflict against it’s will, yet the company can 
also be viewed as being very much a double edged sword in relation to neutrality. On 
one hand Irish Shipping Ltd made neutrality feasible. As Bernard Share stated ‘the role 
played by these ships, most of them on routes for which they were never designed can 
scarcely be overestimated, particularly in the context o f a national policy which had 
steadfastly turned its back on the sea.’ During the course o f the war Irish Shipping 
carried 712,000 tons of wheat, 178,000 tons of coal, 63,000 tons o f phosphates, 24,000 
tons of tobacco, 19,000 tons of newsprint and 10,000 tons of timber to Ireland, supplies 
without which the country could not have possibly maintained her neutrality.94 This fact 
was recognised by de Valera in his speech to the nation on 16 May 1945, when he paid 
tribute ‘to the men of our mercantile marine who faced all the perils of the ocean to 
bring us essential supplies, the nation is profoundly grateful. ’95 Perhaps the greatest 
mark of respect to the vital role played by Irish Shipping in the maintenance of 
neutrality, was the decision to maintain the company in the post-war period, with the 
fleet being enlarged and upgraded.
Although Irish Shipping was vital to the country’s interests on a practical level, 
it also played an important role on a psychological level, both domestically and 
internationally. The implementation of a policy of neutrality in 1939 by de Valera was a
92 T Ryle Dwyer, Irish neutrality and the U.S.A. 1939-47 (Dublin, 1977), p .16.
93 Bernard Share, The emergency-neutral Ireland 1939-45 (Dublin, 1987), pp 101-2.
94 Frank Forde, The long watch (Dublin, 1981), p.64.
95 ibid. p .128.
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bold move, particularly when viewed in light of Irelands historical links with, and 
economic reliance upon Britain. Irish Shipping Ltd can therefore be viewed as a 
physical symbol o f Irish independence, as well as her desire and determination to 
remain neutral. This was equally true on the domestic scene as de Valera attempted to 
prove to both the Irish people and political opponents of neutrality that Irish 
independence was a concrete reality and was not merely dependant on British toleration 
or acquiescence. As Robert Fisk stated
in Eire the need to dem onstrate sovereignty and independence overlapped with the neutrality on 
which the country relied for its defence. For once, symbol and reality were one ... they (the Irish 
Shipping fleet) were a brave enough sym bol o f  the neutrality that de V alera would not break, 
even when the country to which he looked for his traditional support - the U nited States - entered 
the war in 1941.96
The shipping policies adopted by the company, although practical and perhaps 
inevitable given the wartime context, were also highly symbolic o f Irelands 
determination to stand alone and avoid the conflict. Irelands stance as a neutral was 
mirrored in the fact that her ships sailed alone, out of convoy, relying on no foreign 
power for support or protection. The decision not to arm ships also reflected the nations 
desire to avoid conflict at all cost. Irish Shipping Ltd therefore fulfilled a role as 
evidence, to both a domestic and an international audience, that Ireland was in every 
respect independent and sovereign, and would no longer allow foreign powers to dictate 
policy to her.
Paradoxically, although Irish Shipping made the policy of neutrality viable, it 
was also a source of great pressure on that strategy. The reliance of the Irish government 
and the Irish people on the supplies transported by Irish Shipping was recognised at an 
early stage in the war by powers who were less than sympathetic to Irish neutrality and 
consequently Irish Shipping was used as a means by which to place pressure on 
neutrality. Throughout the war, Britain and the U.S.A attempted to coerce de Valera
96 Robert Fisk, In time o f  w ar (London, 1983) p .278.
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into abandoning neutrality. As Fisk states o f British policy towards Ireland during the 
war ‘neither Churchill nor his ministers abandoned the idea that Eire might after all be 
cajoled or intimidated into the war’97 Evidence of this ‘intimidation’ is particularly 
evident in British dealings with Irish Shipping. Almost from the outset o f hostilities 
British actions towards the company were unreceptive and obstructionist, whether it 
was through denial o f shipping tonnage or withholding o f warrants and navicerts. A 
similar policy was adopted by the United States, particularly after her entry into the 
conflict, and again manifested itself in a reluctance to allocate shipping tonnage to the 
Irish. This resentment at Irish neutrality caused great difficulties for Irish Shipping. 
Many ships which could have been acquired by the company were lost, while the 
roundabout routes which neutral ships were obliged to follow increased journey time 
and consequently reduced the volume of supplies imported into the country. At no time 
however did the Irish government consider yielding to these economic sanctions, they 
only served to strengthen the Irish resolve to remain neutral.
The German reaction to Irish Shipping Ltd was very different to that o f the 
allies, as it was to the benefit of the German government if Ireland maintained her 
neutral stance. Irish neutrality denied Britain use of the treaty ports and thus afforded 
the U-boats greater scope for action in the Atlantic. The attacks on the Irish Pine and 
Irish Oak though forced the Irish government to reassess the policy of neutrality. These 
attacks were damaging on two levels, firstly they could be considered as acts of war, 
precipitated as they were by a belligerent power against a neutral country, and secondly, 
as they denied Ireland vital resources at a time when she could ill afford to lose them. It 
was not only the German actions in relation to the sinking of the Irish Oak and Irish 
Pine which effected Irish Shipping and the Irish government though as allied reaction 
to these events caused just as much tension. The failure of the Irish government to issue
97 Robert Fisk, In time o f  w ar (London, 1983) p .258.
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a protest to the German authorities after the sinking of the Irish Pine and the Irish Oak 
proved something of a political coup for the allies. Although the Irish government 
followed what was theoretically the correct course o f action in condemning these 
attacks without attributing blame to any particular belligerent, this action proved 
difficult to justify on the international stage. It therefore gave a pretext to the allied 
powers, under which they could deny Ireland further vital shipping needs and 
consequently make it increasingly difficult to adhere to the policy o f neutrality.
Irish Shipping can therefore be said to have played a contradictory role in Irish 
wartime history. On one hand it was vital to the maintenance o f neutrality, yet 
conversely it was also a major burden on it. Irish Shipping brought Irish neutrality 
closer to the forefront o f international politics than it previously had been and forced the 
government to realise that even by adopting a policy o f neutrality, Ireland could not 
survive in isolation, she was still very much at the mercy of the actions and reactions of 
foreign powers.
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A p p e n d ic e s .
SHIP
Irish Alder
Irish Ash
Irish Beech 
Irish Cedar
Irish Elm
Irish Fir 
Irish Hazel
Irish Larch
Irish Oak 
Irish Pine 
Irish Plane
Irish Poplar
Irish Rose
Irish Spruce 
Irish W illow
D A T E  OF PREV IO U S N A M E  Y E A R  OF SU B SE Q U E N T
PU R C H A SE /C H A R TE R  A N D  N A T IO N A L IT Y  C O N ST R U C T IO N  H ISTO RY
Appendix I
Irish Shipping Ltd Fleet 1941-1945
Jan 1942
A ugust 1942
M ay 1941 
October 1943
October 1941 
June 1941
July 1941
M ay 1941 
M ay 1941 
Septem ber 1941
March 1941
January 1942
April 1942  
October 1941
Piret, Estonian
Mathilde Maersk, Danish 1921
Cevriti 1884
Caterina Gerolimich, Italian
Leda, Panamanian 1910
Margara, Chilean 1920
Noemi Julia, Panamanean 1895
Haifa Trader, Palestinian 1903
West Nerris, U .S .A  1919
West Hematite, U .S .A  1919
Arena, Panamanian 1917
Vassilios Destounis, G reek 1912
Mall, Estonian
Vicia, Finnish 
Otto, Estonian
1896
1918
Returned to owners
1946 
Sold  to Sw eden
1949  
Scrapped 1948 
Returned to Italy
1945 
Sold to Turkey
1949  
S old  1949  
Sold to Turkey 
1949  
Sold to Turkey 
1949  
Sunk M ay 1943 
Sunk N o v  1942  
W recked o f f  Cork
1947  
Sold to Turkey
1949
Returned to owners
1946
Returned to owners 
1946
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Appendix II
1 . I can find no case o f any neutral ever having made a claim against a belligerent for 
loss o f ships through the warlike action of such belligerent without first having 
evidence that such belligerent was in fact responsible. The books do go into detail 
about protests as distinct from claims, because only the latter ‘come to court’ and so 
get fully reported in digests etc.
However, protests, almost invariably, are accompanied by claims for 
compensation or, at least, are succeeded by such claims at the end o f wars. Even if  a 
protest never developed into a compensation-claim, it is scarcely conceivable that 
any neutral would accuse a nominally ‘friendly state’ o f destroying its property 
without some clear-cut evidence. In modern wars, all belligerents launch mines on 
the high seas and all possess submarines and (at present) aircraft. Moreover, 
accidents sometime happen and a neutral ship disappears with all hands as the result 
of a misadventure which may occur in wartime as easily as during times of peace.
2. Our own practice in regard to fixing responsibility for losses has been consistent 
with the foregoing. Although we were warned by the German government (17th Aug 
1940) that our ships were trading in ‘the waters around Britain’ at their own risk, we 
have, quite properly, not assumed on that account that every boat o f ours sunk by 
warlike action was sunk by the Germans. If we had treated the circumstantial 
evidence constituted by the German warning as conclusive proof of Germany’s 
responsibility for all Irish ships sunk, we would have been ignoring (1) the fact that 
the waters in which we trade are strewn with the mines o f other belligerents (mainly 
indeed with British mines), (2) the fact that torpedo attacks could, up to recently, 
have been made by the Italian, as well as by the German submarines -  to go no
Fixing Responsibility for Sinkings.
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farther, (3) that all belligerents attack ships from the air and that any o f them are 
likely to make a mistake (e.g. the British error re “Kerlogue” in last weeks), (4) that 
accidents of a normal peacetime kind may still happen to ships at sea.
In addition to all this, we cannot completely ignore the fact that, on countless 
occasions, German planes and submarines have sighted our ships, identified them 
and then allowed them to proceed unmolested. If they had always attacked our ships 
at sight, we could probably feel justified in making protests to Germany on the 
circumstantial evidence such a policy would certainly represent. We have, however, 
no such justification.
3. The practice as far as we are concerned has therefore been: (A) Where there is 
evidence that a certain belligerent was responsible for sinking an Irish ship or Irish 
chartered ship, (i) to protest and claim or (ii) to protest only; (B) Where there is no 
evidence, but where the particular circumstances point to warlike action for which 
one of the belligerents is more likely to be responsible than another -  to request that 
belligerent to make enquiries with a view to fixing responsibility and (C) where 
nothing at all is known about the particular circumstances of the sinking (which 
might, sometimes, be due to an ordinary accident) and where no belligerent can be 
considered more likely to be responsible than another -  no action.
4. Cases under A, above number to date two the belligerents concerned being in both 
cases Germany.
Cases under B above number to date two the belligerents approached being in one 
case Germany in the other Germany and Italy.
Cases under C above number 12; they include the cases of the Irish Pine and the 
Irish Oak.
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It is understood that a procedure similar to ours (no protest without direct evidence) 
was consistently followed by the United States when neutral in the last war and, 
presumably, also in this one.
611 January 1944.
Source: (N.A. Foreign affairs papers 206/60/11)
APPENDIX III
Irish Ships Identification Signs Communicated to Germany
Name of vessel Type and Funnel On sides
and international size of Markings of ships
code sign ship
Other particulars 
by which ships 
could be 
identified
Irish Alder 
EINV
Cargo 
Length 288.1  
Breadth 45.0  
Gross Tonnage 2668 .0
B lack funnel Letters EIRE in  
with letters ISL large w hite letters 
on white shield, w ith Irish flag
Letters and rim fore and aft, the
o f  shield red. letters on both sides
amidships. Irish flag  
also on both sides o f  
the b ow  and stern.
Hull black. 
B ridgehouse a 
superstructure 
buff. T w o masts 
Irish flag  on 
one hatch forward 
and one hatch aft 
Irish flag  painted on
Both sides am idships both sides o f  the
flood lit at night vertical board on poop  
deck i f  fitted. Flag on 
after hatch and vertical 
board, i f  fitted, floodlit 
at night. Ships nam e in 
large letters cut in the 
sides o f  a box or trunk 
above the boat deck  
and lighted from the 
inside at night, name 
readable at about one 
m ile. Letters EIRE in 
sim ilar lettering cut in 
the sides o f  a box or 
trunk on the poop, also  
lighted from the inside 
at night.
Irish Ash Cargo
EINZ Length 288.1
Breadth 45.0  
Gross Tonnage 2122
do do do
Source: (N.A. Berlin embassy papers 48/11)
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